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PEOPLE V. MODESTO

[62C.2d

[Crim. No. 7877. In Bank. Feb. 11, 1965.]

THE PEOPLE. Plaintiff and Respondent, V. LAWRENCE
GLENN MODESTO, Defendant and Appellant.
[1] Oriminal Law-Venue-Ohange of Venue-Prejudice of Oom-

munity.-The trial court on retrial of a first degree murder
ease eould reasonably conclude that defendant could secure
a fair trial in the county of trial notwithstanding extensive
newspaper coverage of his first trial, and the court did not
abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a
(lhange of venue without prejudice before trial or err in failing thereafter to raise the question on its own motion, where
the ease was retried before a different trial judge, no difficulty
was experienced in securing jurors who were not aware of
the earlier publicity, and defendant did not exhaust his peremptory challenges or renew his motion to change venue.
[2] Homicide-Evidence-Photographs.-In a prosecution for
the murder of two young girls, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in determining that the probative value of photographs and color slides of the victims, which it admitted in
evidence, outweighed any probable prejudicial effect.
[3] Oriminal Law-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity.On the sanity trial of a murder prosecution arising out of
the killing of two young girls, verdicts finding defendant
sane could not be disturbed in view ofa conflict in the testimony of psychiatrists as to whether he was sane or insane
at the time he committed the homicides.
[4] Id.-Evidence-Oonfessions-Admissibility.-In a prosecution
for the murder of two young girls, defendant's last and most
damaging statements to the police describing the details of
the commission of the crime against one of the girls, including the fact that he thought he had had intercourse with her,
were not admissible where they were made. during an investigation focused on defendant who was then in custody
[2] See Oal.Jur.2d, Evidence, §§ 226-230j Am.Jur., Evidence (1st
cd § 451).
[4] l'ee Oal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, §146j Evidence, §422' Am.
Jur., Criminal Law (1st ed § 167 ct seq).
'
McK. Dig. References; [1] Criminal Law, § 88; [2] Homicide,
§1l8; [3] Criminal Law, §235(4); [4-6] Criminal Law, §464;
[7, 18] Criminal Law, §§ 628(1a), 852.1; Witnesses, § 19; [8]
Criminal Law, §628(1); Witnesses, §19; [9] Witnesses, §14;
[10-15] Criminal Law, §§ 628(la), 852.1; [16,17] Witnesses, § 19;
[19] Criminal Law, § 1011.1.
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and said repeatedly that he wished to tell his attorney first,
where the authorities did not effectively inform him of
his right to counselor absolute right to remain silent, where
no evidence established his waiver of these rights, and where
the authorities' process of interrogation lent itself to eliciting
incriminating statements. It was immaterial that defendant
was allowed to consult with his attorney several hours earlier
and was advised that he could talk to the police if he wished
and repeat the substantially less damaging admissions he had
already made, there being no evidence that he was advised
as to what he should or could do in the face of the continuing
interrogation that took place.
[5] Id.-Evidence-Oonfessions-Admissibility.-In a prosecution
for the murder of two young girls, statements made by defendant to the police before the body of one of the girls
was discovered were admissible, where they were freely and
voluntarily made at a time when the officers were concerned
primarily with the possibility of saving the girl's life; this
paramount interest justified the officers in not impeding their
rescue e1Iorts by informing defendant of his rights to remain
silent and to the assistance of counsel.
[6J Id.-Evidence-Oonfessions-Admissibility.-!n a prosecution
for the murder of two young girls, statements made by defendant between the time one girl's body was found and the time
he sought to consult again with his attorney were inadmissible
unless, as to such statements, he waived his right to counsel
and his right to remain silent.
[7&,7bJ Id.-Comment on Failure of Defendant to Testify: Witnesses-Self-incrimination.-Const., art. I, § 13, permitting both
the trial court and the prosecutor to comment on defendant's
failure to take the stand in a criminal case, does not infringe
his privilege against self-incrimination.
[8] Id.-Comment on Failure of Defendant to Testify: Witnesses
-Self-incrimina.tion.-The rule against comment in the federal
courts by the trial court and the prosecutor on defendant's
failure to take the stand does not necessitate holding the state
comment rule unconstitutional, since the federal rule is founded
not on constitutional command but on statutory interpretation ..
[9J Witnesses-Self-incrimination.-Although it is the federal
privilege against self-incrimination that is protected by U.S.,
[7] Constitutional or statutory provision permitting comment on
failure of accus'ed to testify in his own behalf as violation of constitutional privilege against self-crimination note, 104 A.L.B.. 478.
Comment by court suggesting that,jury may take into consideration
failure of accused person to testify, note, 94 A.L.B.. 701. See also
Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, §§ 115,116; Witnesses, § 19.
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Const., 14th Amend., the state must follow only the constitutional and not the statutory aspects of the privilege.
[10] Criminal Law-Comment on Fa.ilure of Defendant to 'l'estify.
-Const., art. I, § 13, permitting the trial court and the prosecutor to comment on defendant's failure to take the stand in
a criminal case, does not relieve the prosecution of its burden
of proving every essential element of the crime and defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. No presumption of guilt or
of the truth of any fact arises, and no inference can be drawn
if defendant does not have the knowledge necessary to explain
or deny the evidence against him.
[11] ld.-Comment on Failure of Defenda.nt to'l'estify.-Comment
by the trial court and the prosecutor on defendant's failure to
take the stand, as permitted by Const., art. I, § 13, serves merely to advise the jury how to treat the evidence that the prosecution has introduced. If it appears from the evidence that
defendant could reasonably be expected to explain or deny
evidence presented against him, the jury may consider his
failure to do so as tending to indicate the truth of such evidence and as indicating that among the inferences that may
reasonably be drawn therefrom, those unfavorable to defendant are the more probable.
[12] ld.-Comment on Fa.ilure of Defendant to 'l'estify.-The California comment rule does not subject defendant to the trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt, since he remains
free not to testify. It does not substitute an inquisitorial
system for an accusatorial system, affords no opportunity for
eliciting statements by inhumane treatment or abuses, does
not permit the government to disturb the individual without
good cause or deprecate the inviolability of the human personality, does not compel reliance on self-deprecatory statements, and thus does not significantly impair any protection
the privilege against self-incrimination affords the innocent.
[18] ld.-Comment on Failure of Defendant to 'l'estify.-Where
defendant in a criminal case is normally faced with the choice
of testifying to avoid adverse inferences or of remaining silent
and suffering their cousequences, comments by the trial court
or the prosecutor on defendant's failure to testify do not
magnify these normal negative consequences to the extent that
they become a "penalty" prohibited by U.S. Const., 14th
Amend.
[14] ld.-Comment on Fa.ilure of Defendant to 'l'estify.-Although
comments by the trial court or the prosecutor on defendant's
failure to testify might encourage some defendants to testify
to avoid the inferences that may reasonably be drawn from
their failure to do so, this encouragement does not amount to
the oompulsion to testify condemned by U. S. Coust., 5th
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Amend.; the comments merely guide the jury in doing what it
would nonnally do in any casco
[15] Id.-oomment on Failure of Defendant to Testify.-The state
Supreme Court is bound by the California Constitution's provision for comment by the trial court or the prosecutor on
defendant's failure to testify, unless such ,provision clearly
violates the United States Constitution.
[16] Witnesses-Duty to Testify-Effect of Failure to Testify.Though a defendant may refuse to testify because of fear that
" his prior convictions will be introduced to impeach him and
will prejudice the jury, the inference that the jury is
authorized to ,draw from his failure to take the stand
need not be the only plausible one ,to be rational. under
the due process clause. Even without tbcrule permitting
comment by the trial court or the prosecutor, defendant still
faces the dilemma of choosing to testify and having his prior
convictions introduced or of remaining silent and not giving
',
.
his evidence to the jury.
I17] Id•....;;.self-incrimination-Defendants in Oriminal Oases.-The
privilege against self-incrimination protects defendant from assisting the prosecution in building its case against him. It
cannot protect him from the inferences that may reasonably
be drawn from his failure to' rebut the prosecution's ease to
the best of his apparent ability.
[18] Oriminal Law-Oomment on Failure of Defendant to Testify:
Witnesses-8elf-incrimina.tion.-Existence of the privilege
against self-incrimination is a matter of common knowledge,
and whatever use defendant makes of it at his trial is also a
fact known to the jury. The objective of the court's instructions
and counsel's arguments in commenting on defendant's failure
to testify is to assist the jury in reaching the correct decision
on the basis of all of tbe evidence before it; U. S. Const., 5th
Amend., condemning the compUlsion to testify, imposes no
pointless taboo on the pursuit of that objective.
[19] Id.-Punishment-Procedure for Determining Penalty.-On
the penalty phase of a capital case, no error could be based
on admitting into evidence inflammatory details of other crimes
committed by defendant where the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in determining that the probatiVe value of the
challenged evidence outweighed any probable prejudicial e1lect.

APPEAL, ,"utomatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239,
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside
County. John G. Gabbert, Jud,e. Reversed.
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing
the death penalty, reversed.

)
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Richard Gladstein, under appointment by the Supreme
Court, and Norman Leonard for Defendant and Appellant.
Stanley Mosk and Thomas C. Lynch, Attorneys General,
William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, Norman H.
Sokolow, Deputy Attorney General, William O. Mackey, District Attorney (Riverside), and Roland Wilson, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-This appeal is automatic from a judgment imposing the death penalty. (Pen. Code, § 1239,
.
subd. (b).)
In a previous trial defendant had been found .guilty of the
first degree murders of Connie Mack and Mary Mack, and
sentenced to death. The judgment was reversed on the ground
that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury
on the issue of manslaughter. (PeopZe v. Modesto, 59 Ca1.2d
'722,727-731 [31 Cal.Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33].) Before retrial
defendant reinstated his pleas of not guilty by reason of
insanity, which he had withdrawn during the first trial. Upon
retrial the jury found defendant guilty of two counts of
first degree murder, determined that he was sane at the time
each crime was committed, and fixed the penalty on each
count at death.
At the retrial on the issue of guilt the prosecution introduced substantially the same evidence it introduced at the
former trial. The basic facts were summarized in our former
opinion as follows .
•• Shortly after midnight on October 29, 1961, defendant
entered the home of Mr. and Mrs. Ardel Mack carrying a
hand sledge hammer with a 4-pound head. The Macks' daughters, Connie, age 12, and Mary, age 9, were asleep in the
house. At about 10 :30 p.m. the previous evening defendant
had seen Mr. and Mrs. Mack at a place where Mr. Mack played
the guitar with a band and knew that they would not return
home until about 2 a.m. Upon returning home the Macks
found Mary lying on the :8.oor dead. Connie had disappeared.
Her blankets were on the :8.oor. and there was blood on her bed.
"Defendant was arrested at his home at about 2 :30 a.m.,
October 29, 1961. The arresting officers found bloodstains
on the right rear fendfr, the right rear door handle, the rear
seat, and the :8.oor mat of defendant'8 automobile. The blood
on the rear seat appeared to have been smeared by a body
~oving on the seat. Defendant's sledge hammer was removed
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from the trunk of his automobile. A chemist testified that
the hammer had been heavily smeared with blood and had
been washed.
"At the time of his arrest, defendant was asleep in his
bed, wearing only a pair of shorts. His hands were bloodstained, as were his shorts and his other clothes found on the
floor of his room. A police chemist testified that there were
semen stains on defendant's T-shirt, on the outside of his
trousers, and on the shorts he was wearing when arrested .
•• At 7 p.m. on the day of his arrest, defendant admitted
to police investigators that he struck Mary and Connie with
the sledge hammer. He stated that he entered the Mack homc
'with the intentions of scaring Connie Jean for the way she
has been acting, snotty and smart-aleckie, and just to kind of
get back at her for a lot of things she said. I went into the
house through the side door. The house was dark and the
door wasn't locked. So I went to the bedroom, flicked on the
light and Connie Jean turned over and mumbled something
and I shut the light off again, and I went over to shake her
awake, and little Mary turned on the light, and I turned
around with the intention of scaring her, and my hand went
too far and I hit her with the sledge hammer. She went down,
moaning, and Connie Jean started screaming, so I told her
to be quiet, and I went like this (indicating) to hit her too,
but my hammer just went right on and I hit her too; and
I don't know, after that I don't know how many times I hit
them-three or four or five times apiece--I don't know. They
were moaning and screaming and I couldn't remember how
many times I hit them. •
,. Defendant stated to the officers that he then picked up
Connie and dropped her on the lawn, returning to the house
for the hammer. After putting Connie's unconscious body
on the rear floor of the car, defendant stated that he intended
to go back for Mary, but panicked and drove away when he
saw the lights of approaching automobiles. Shortly thereafter
he stopped at a drainage ditch to clean the blood from Connie's head. 'When I opened the door her legs hung out. And
the next thing I knew she was on the ground-so I grabbed
her by the hand and pulled her over to the side of that drainage ditch . . . ~ I could get some water to clean her off, and
she just tumbled into the water, moaning loudly.... '
"Defendant also stated to tile officers that 'Between there
[the drainage ditch] and . . . the house . . . I don't know

)
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where I stopped. I'm not sure in my mind, but I think-II
think I had intercourse with Connie-I'm not sure.'
"Connie's body was found face down in the drainage ditch
downstream from the point at whieh defendant stated she
had gone into the water.
,. Autopsies of the girls' bodies showed four separate injurieS
to Connie's head and 1ive separate injuries to Mary's head,
which were probably in1licted by the sledge hammer. Although
drowning was the immediate cause of Connie's death" the
injuries to her head would have been fatal. Mary's ,death
resulted from injuries to the brain caused by multiple skull \'
fractures. Since Connie had been carried downstream in
rapidly moving water and had been in the water nine to ten
hours, the pathologist was unable to state whether or not she
had been sexually molested;" (People v. Modesto, 59 Cal.2d
722, 725-727 [31 Ca1.Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33].)
I
It is not disputed that defendant killed the two girls. The
prosecution sought to prove that the killings were murders I
of the 1irst degree on the ground that they were either wilful, 1
deliberate, and premeditated, or occurred during the com- '
mission of burglary, rape, or an act punishable under Penal !
Code section 288. (Pen. Code, § 189.) Defendant did not \
testify. lie relied on evidence of intoxication and brain dam- ,
age to support the opinion of expert witnesses that he did not '
form a deliberate and premeditated intent to kill or an intent I
to commit any of the enumerated felonies. Although he presented more extensive evidence of this defense at the retrial
than at the former trial, we are not persuaded to depart from
our holding on the former appeal that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdicts. (59 Ca1.2d at p. 727.)
,
[1] Defendant contends that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for a change of venue on the groUIfd that
he could not obtain a fair and impartial trial in Riverside
County. (Pen. Code, § 1033.) He supported his motion with
affidavits setting forth the extensive newspaper coverage of
his 1irst trial and this court's reversal of the judgment. He
asserts that the prospective jurors must have been aware of
his criminal record, including the fact that he was on parole
from a judgment of conviction of second degree murder at
the time 'of the present homicides; that he had confessed;
and tha(the trial judge at the 1irst trial had stated his agreement with the verdicts and later vigorously criticized the
decision of this court reversing the judgment.
The newspaper articles attached to defendant's affidavit

I

I
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were published from October 31, 1961, to July 17, 1963. The
case was retried before a different trial judge, who denied
defendant's motion to change venue without prejudice on
September 10, 1963. The trial was commenced on October 14,
1963, and no difficulty was experienced in securing jurors who
were not aware of the earlier publicity. Defendant did not
eXhaust his peremptory challenges, and he did not renew his
motion to change venue. Under these circumstances the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's
motion without prejudice before trial and did not err in
failing to raise the question on its own motion thereafter.
.. It could reasonably conclude that defendant Could secure a
. fair trial in Riverside County..(See People v. Duncan, 53
Cal.2d 803,812 [350 P.2d 103J ;cf. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.
717, 720, 726-727 [81 8. Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d751]; People v.
McKay, 37 Ca1.2d 792, 800 [236 P.2d 145J.)
[2] Defendant contends that· the trial court erred in
admitting into evidence photographs and color slides of the
victims. We adhere to our holding on the former appeal that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining .
that the probative value of this evidence outweighed any
probable prejudicial effect. (PeopZe v. Modesto, 69 Ca1.2d
722, 733-734 [31 Cal.Rptr. 225·, 382P.2d 33].)
[3] At the trial on the issue of sanity, defendant relied
on the testimony of two psychiatrists that he was undergoing
a psycho-motor epileptie seizure at the time he committed the
homirides and was therefore legally insane. The proseeution
relied on the testimony of four other psyehiatrists to the effect
that defendant was legally sane. In view of this eorillict, there
is no merit in defendant's contention that the evidenee does
not support the verdiets finding him sane.
['] At the trial on the issue of guilt several statements
made by defendaI;lt to the police were introduced into evidence over objection after the prosecution laid a foundation
that each statement was freely and voluntarily made. Defendant contends that at least the last and most damaging
of these statements was inadmissible under the decisions of
the United States Supreme Court in Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201 l'84 S.Ct. 1199, 12L.Ed.2d 246], and Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [84 S.Ct. 1768, 12 L.Ed.2d 977].
We shall eonsider the admissibi)ity of all of them in the light
of those decisions.
Officer Mabbitt questioned defendant at about 6 in the
morning following the homicides. At that time Connie's
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.body llad not been found. Defendant stated that he met
Connie's father about 10 a.m. the day before and that he and
Connie's father bought beer and drove around while drinking
it. About 3 :30 in the afternoon they picked up Connie. and
took her home. She refused to ride in the front seat between
defendant and her father until her father told her to do so.
After taking Connie home, the two men bought and drank
more beer and then took someone from the Modesto residence
to a christening.
About 7 :30 a.m. Officer Mabbitt was joined by Mr. Boller,
an investigator from the district attorney's office, and the
two had a second conversation with defendant. He repeated
to .Mr.Boller what he had told Officer Mabbitt and at tirst
denied having seen Connie after he took her home the afternoon before. . Either Officer Mabbitt or Mr. Boller suggested
·to defendant that Connie might still be alive and that if he
could help them to locate her, they might be able to save her
. life. Defendant studied a few minu.tes and then said "water,"
studied a few more minutes and said, "Avenue 62 and the
storm drain." He then· told the officers that Connie fell in
.the water and that he would show them where it happened.
. The officers took defendant to the storm drain, and he
$howed them where Connie fell into it. While the officers and
defendant were at the storm drain, Mr. Marsh, an attorney
acting apparently'at the request of defendant's family, arrived to representbim.Mr.Marsh conferred privately with
defendant in the police car and then joined in the search .
Shortly thereafter the officers learned that Connie's body had
been found some distance away, and they returned with defendant to the police station.
About 1 :20 in the afternoon Officer Mabbitt interrogated
defendant again. Mr. BoUer and a court reporter were also
present, and the interview was taken down and transcribed.
Defendant repeated the same story he had told before about
being with Mr. Mack, drinking beer, picking up .Connie and
taking her home, and going to the christening. He also stated
that later in the evening he went to a cafe where Mr. Mack
worked and to another cafe. He met his mother and father
and they all drank beer. His father drove him home because
he was too drunk to drive. The next thing he remembered
was seeing Connie on the floor of the back seat of his car with
blood over her. He took her to the storm drain to wash the
blood off, and she slipped into the water. He looked for ller
along the bank, and although he could not see her, he could
hear her moaning and thought she had caught on some roots
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or something. He then drove home, and the next thing he
knew the officers awakened him. He stated that he must have
hit Connie but did not remember. He did not remember using
any weapon or going to the Mack home that night. He was
asked whether he had any difficulty with Connie in the past
and stated that she treated him as if he was dirt. During
the interview, after answering a question about his wife's car,
he volunteered that "I have given that statement, and Mr.
Marsh [the attorney] has told me tIl at he didn't care, just to
repeat what I'd said here. He said 'You can talk to them if
you want to, and if you don't, well then--'."
About 3 :30 in the afternoon, Undersheriff Presley took
over the questioning of defendant. He told defendant several
times that he did not believe that defendant did not remember further details of the crimes. He testified that ., There
was considerable discussion back and forth on these points
and finally he said that he would like to tell his attorney first .
. . . Q. What did you say to that! A. Well, I tried to impress him at this time the importance of telling us at this
particular time, rather than to wait and tell the attorney
later.•.. I pointed out to Mr. Modesto in the light of this
statement regarding the attorney, the fact he could tell his
attorney what had happened, I felt he did remember and
he was also capable of telling us at this time."
The officers then took defendant to dinner and made an
unsuccessful attempt to reach Mr. Marsh. After dinner
Undersheriff Presley took defendant back to the office where
he had been interviewing him and attempted without success
to call Mr. Marsh on the telephone. He then gave the telephone to defendant, who dialed Mr. Marsh's number but was
also unable to reach him. Defendant then started to tell the
officers what had occurred. He made the statements set forth
above in which he described the details of the commission
of the crime including the fact that he thought he had had
intercourse with Connie.
In Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-491 [84 S.Ct.
1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977], the United States Supreme Court
held that "where . . . [a criminal] investigation is no longer
a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to
focus on It particular suspect, the suspect has been taken
into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements,
the suspect has requested and be<.>n denied an opportunity to
consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively
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warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain;
silent, the accused has been denied t the Assistance of Counsel'·
in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as 1
t made obligatory upon the States by the FourtecnthAmend- .1
ment,' Gideon v. Wainwright, 872 U.S., at 342 [372 U.S. 335 i
(83 8. Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 93 A.L.R.2d 733)], and that
no statement elicited by the police during the interrogation
may be used against him at a criminal trial."
With respect to defendant's last and most complete and
damaging statements, all of the conditions of the Escobedo
holding were met. It is immaterial that defendant was alIowed
to consult with his attorney several hours earlier and was
advised that he could talk to the police if he wished and repeat the substantially less damaging admissions he had already
made at that time. Escobedo had also discussed with his attorney what he should do incase of interrogation, but in this
case as in the Escobedo case, there is no evidence that defendant was advised as to what he should or could do in the face
of the continuing interrogation that took place. (Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485, fn. 5 [84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d
977].) Accordingly, the judgment must be reversed.
The admissibility of defendant's other statements will arise
on retrial. [5] The statements made by defendant before
Connie's body was discovered are admissible. They were
freely and voluntarily made at a time when the officers were
concerned primarily with the possibility of saving Connie's
life. The paramount interest in saving her life, if possible,
clearly justified the officers in not impeding their rescue
efforts by informing defendant of his rights to remain silent
and to the assistance of counsel. Since these statements were
yoluntarily made and lawfully obtained, there is no basis
for their exclusion. (See People v. Roberts, 47 Cal.2d 374,
379 [303 P.2d 721].) It is true that in Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201 [84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246], the
United States Supreme Court held that incriminating statements surreptitiously obtained from an indicted defendant
who had been released on bail could not be used against him
at his trial even though the court assumed the statements
were lawf\lUy obtained in the course of a continuing police
investigation of crime. In the Massiah case, however, no compelling emergency was present, and the continuing investigation of other crimes could reasonably be segregated from the
proof of the crime for which the defendant had been indicted.
In the present case the officers' investigatory and rescue
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operations were necessarily inextricably interwoven until
Oonnie's body was found, and it would be needlessly restrictive to exclude any evidence lawfully obtained during the
rescue operations. Under these circumstances we do not believe that the Massiak case is controlling.
[6] The statements made between the time Connie's body
was found and the time defendant sought to consult again
with his attorney present still a different problem. Under
our holding in People v. Dorado, ante, p.S38 [42 Cal.
Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361],thcse statements are inadmissible
unless as to them defendant· waived his right to counsel and
his right to remain silent. In view of his reference to his
attorney's advice with respect to making these statements,
it is possible that defendant waived his· rights as to them.
That reference was ambiguous at best, however, and unless the
prosecution can present additional evidence of waiver on
retrial, these statements should be excluded.
[7a] Both the trial court and the prosecutor, as the California comment rule1 allows, commented on the failure of
the defendant to take the stand. Defendant contends that
these comments infringed his privilege against self-incrimination, 2 now guaranteed by tbe Fourteenth Amendment to state
criminal defendants (Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 [84 S.Ct.
1489,12 L.Ed.2d 653]), by permitting unfavorable references
from his refusal to testify. We reject this contention. We
hold tbat the use of the comment in defendant's trial was constitutionally permissible.
There is no .authoritative holding wbether state comment
rules violate the privilege against self-incrimination. The
United States Supreme Court bas heard two cases challenging
state comment rules, but refused to decide the issue in both
of them. (Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 2-3, fn. 1 [84 S.Ot.
1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 6531.) In the first case, Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 90-91 [29 S.Ct. 14,53 L.Ed. 97], the
court assumed that the comment infringed the federal privilege against self-incrimination but held that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not require the states to grant that privilege.
l"No pers9n shall ••• be C(IDlpeUed, in any criminal ease, to be a witness against himself .•• but in any criminal ease, whether the defendant
testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny by his testimony any
evidence or facts in the ease against him may be commented upon by the
court and by counsel, and may btl considered by the court or the jury."
(Cal. Const., art. I, 113; sce Pen. Code, 11323.)
2 "No person ••• shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, ••• " (U.S. Const., Amend. V.)

)

"
)

--)

448

PEOPLE tI. MODESTO

The court emphasized that "We have assumed only for
purpose of discussion that what was .done in the case at
was an infringement of the privilege against
..
tion. We do not intend, however, to lend any
to the truth of that assumption." (211 U.S. 78, 114.)
Adamson v. Ca],ifornia, 332 U.S. 46, 50 [67 S.Ct. 1672, 91
L.Ed. 1903, 171 A.L.R. 1223], the court again assumed that
the comment would violate the privilege "without any in-·
tention thereby of ruling upon the issue," and followed its
holding in Twining that the Fifth Amendment was not binding upon the states. B The state courts have divided on the
question whether the comment rule violates state constitutienal
protections of the privilege against self-incrimination. (Com- .
pare In re Opinion of the Justices, 300 Mass. 620, 625 [15.
N.E.2d 662] (1 dissent); State v. Wolfe, 64 S.D. 178,
188 [266 N.W. 116, 104 A.L.R. 464] (2 dissents) (holding the
comment unconstitutional) with State v. Baker, 115 Vt. 94, .
98-111 [53 A.2d 53] (2 dissents) ; State v. Sandova]" 59 N.M..
85, 88-90 [279 P.2d 850] (finding the comment constitutional) .) ~
[8] The rule against comment in the federal courts does
not necessitate our holding the California comment rule unconstitutional. The federal rule is founded not on constitutional command but on statutory interpretation. The con- .
gressional provision that a defendant's failure to request to
be a witness in the case "shall not create any presumption
against him" (18 U.S.C. § 3481) has been interpreted to
exclude any comment. (W~1son v. United States, 149 U.S.
60,65 (13 S.Ct. 765, 37 L.Ed. 650] ; Bruno v. United States,
308 U.S. 287, 292-293 [60 S.Ct. 198, 84 L.Ed. 257] ; Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 50, fn. 6 [67 S.Ot. 1672, 91 L.Ed.
1903, 171 A.L.R. 1223].) [9] Although it is the federal
privilege that is now protected by the Fourteenth Amendment ~..
(Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 [84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d
653]), the state must follow only the constitutional and not
BMr. Justice Black, in dissent, felt that the court's opinion "strongly
implies that the Fifth Amendment does not, of itself, bar comment upon
failure to testify in federal courts.•.• " (332 U.S. 46, 69.)
~In 1869, in People v. Tyler, 36 Cal. 522, 530, before the California
Constitution wB.( amended to permit comment, this court held that the
comment made 1n that ease violated the state privilege against se1fincrimination. The district attorney had argued that silence was a
circumstance" tending strongly to prove [defendant's] guilt." (PeopZe
v. Tyler, 36 Cal. 522, 527.) The amendment to the California Constitution allows a much more limited COmment. (People V • .A.ao17l8oo, 27
Oal.2d 478,489·490 [165 P.2d 3].)
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the statutory aspects of the privilege. (Ker v. Califorma,
374 U.S. 23, 31-34 [83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726].) Defendantcontends that the statement in Johnson v. Umted
States, 318 U.S. 189, 196 [63 S.Ct. 549, 87 L.Ed. 704],that
" 'no inferences whatever can be legitimately drawn' "from
invoking the privilege, establishes that no comment can constitutionally be made on the accused's failure to testify in
the federal courts. In that case, however, the trial court had
assured the defendant that he could refuse to answer certain
questions while on the stand, and yet allowed adverse com~
ment on that refusal. The Supreme Court condemned this
misleading of the defendant on the consequences of his assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination. Indeed in
Adamson the court distinguished Johnson on this ground.
It stated that under the California rule "The choice between
giving evidence and remaining silent was an open choice.
There was no such possible misleading of the defendant as
we condemned in Johnson v. United Slates, 318 U.S. 189,
195-199 {63 S.Ct. 549, 87 L.Ed. '104]." (Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,58, fn. 17 [67 S.Ct. 1672,91 L.Ed. 1903,
171 A.L.R. 1223].) Thus, by expressly refraining from deciding whether comment would be permissible under the Fifth
Amendment and by distinguishing Johnson on the ground
that the accused had been inisled, the court in Adamson made
clear that the broad language in Johnson was dictum. Moreover, defendant's refusal to testify can sometimes be used
against him in a federal trial. Thus, once the defendant
has taken the stand, the federal rule allows comment on his
failure to testify on all aspects of the case. (Caminetti v.
United States, 242 U.S. 470, 492-495 [37 S.Ct. 192, 61 L.Ed.
442].) Furthermore, defendant's assertion of the privilege
in an earlier trial can be used to impeach specific testimony
when he takes the stand in a later trial (Raffel v. United
States, 271 U.S. 494, 497-499 [46 S.Ct. 566,70 L.Ed. 1054]),
unless the silence is not inconsistent with his testimony and
is used only to impeach his general credibility. (Grunewald v.
United States, 353 U.S. 391, 418-424 [77 S.Ct. 963, 1 L.Ed.2d
931, 62 A.L.R.2d 1344]; see Stewart v. United States, 366
U.S. 1, 6 [81 S.Ct. 941, 6 L.Ed.2d 84].)
In determintng the constitutionality of the California comment rule, the narrow scope of the permission to comment is
crucial. I [10] The comment rule does not relieve the proseIAllowing lome types of comment might be a denial of due process.
·'For example, a statute might declare that a permitted refuaal to
_C.M-II
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cution of its burden of proving every essential elementofJ
the crime and. the defen~ant 's guilt beyond a reasonable do~bt.y
No presumptIon of guilt or of the truth of any fact ansea.\:
No inference can be drawn if defendant does Dot have the)
knowledge necessary to explain or deny the evidence against ~l
him. (People v. Adamson, 27 Cal.2d 478, 489-490 [165 P.2d"~
8]; Adamson v. OalifOf"nia, 332 U.S. 46, 55-56 {67 S.Ct. 1672, .•~
91 L.Ed. 1903, 171 A.L.R. 1223].) [11] The comment 8erves~
merely to advise the jury how to treat the evidence the:
prosecution has introduced. (People v. Ashley, 42 Ca1.2d 246,',1
268-269 [267 P.2d 271], cert. den. 348 U.S. 900 [75 s.Ct. 222,1
99 L.Ed. 707].) "[I]f it appears from the evidence thatJ
defendant could reasonably be expected to explain or deny J
evidence presented against him, the jury may consider his :~
failure to do 80 as tending to indicate the truth of such ;
evidence and as indicating that among the inferences that
may reasonably be drawn therefrom, those unfavorable to the J
defendant are the more probable." (People v. Adamson,'
27 Cal.2d 478, 490-491 [165 P.2d 3].)
[7b] Such carefully circumscribed comment does not con:flict with the policies of the federal privilege against selfincrimination. The United States Supreme Court restated
those policies in Murphy v. Waferfront Oom., 878 U.S. 52, 55
[84 S,Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678], on the same day it held the'
Fifth Amendment binding on the states. It stated that the
privilege was based on "our unwillingness to subject those
suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation,
perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial
rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our
fear that self-incrimination statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which
dictates 'a fair state-individual balance by requiring the
government to leave the individual alone until good cause
is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire
load,' . . . ; our respect for the inviolability of the human
personality and of the right of each individual 'to a private
enclave where he may lead a private life,' . . . ; our distrust
of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the
pri\rilege, while sometimes 'a shelter to the guilty' is often
a 'protection to the innocent.''' [12] The California comI

testify would eompel an aeeeptance of the truth of the pr08ecution's
evidence." (..400fMOft v. CtJli!omiQ" 332 U.S. 46, 65 [67 S.Ct. 1672, 91
L.Ed. 1903,171 A.L.R. 1223].)
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ment rule does not subject the defendant to the trilemma of
self-accusation, perjury, or contempt, for he remains free not
to testify. It does not substitute an inquisitorial system for
an accusatorial system, for the state must introduce evidence
of every element of the defendant's guilt before any inferenee
can be drawn from his silence. (People v. Talle, 111 Cal.
.App.2d 650, 664, 676 [245 P.2d 633].) It affords no opportunity for eliciting statements by inhumane treatment or
abuses. It does not permit the government to disturb the
individual without good cause or deprecate the inviolability
of the human personality and the right of each individual
" 'to a private enclave where he may lead a private life.' ,.
It does not compel reliance on self-deprecatory statements.
Thus it does not significantly impair any protection the
privilege affords the innocent.
Defendant contends, however, that Malloy v. Hogan, 878
U.S. 1, 8 [84 8.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 658], establishes that
the comment rule violates the privilege against self-incrimination. In that case, the petitioner refused to answer any
questions, relying on his privilege against self-incrimination.
The state court found, however, that the privilege was not
properly invoked. Petitioner was therefore committed to
prison until he was willing to answer the questions. The
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed petitioner the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination and that under
the applicable federal standard, petitioner properly asserted
the privilege. In discussing the rule that the Fourteenth
Amendment forbids the state from coercing a confession, the
court stated that "it follows a fortiori that it also forbids the
States to resort to imprisonment, as here, to compel him to
answer questions that might incriminate him. The Fourteenth
Amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege
t.hat t.he Fifth Amendment guarantees against f~deral infringement-the right of a person to remain silent unless he
chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will,
and to suffer no penalty, as held in Twining, for such silence."
(378 U.S. I, 8; see Grunewald v. United States, 853 U.S. 391,
425 [77 S.Ct. 963, 1 L.Ed.2d 931, 62 A.L.R.2d 1844] (dissent) ; Adamson v. California, 832 U.S. 46, 124 [67 8.Ct. 1672,
91 L.Ed. 1903, lql A.L.R. 1223] (dissent).)
Defendant contends that the inference permitted by the
comment rule and comment thereon restricts "the unfettered
exercise of his own will" and constitutes a "penalty" within
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the meaning of the quoted language. In the Malloy ease,
however, the court refrained from expressing any opinion on
the constitutionality of the comment rule. We do not believe
.that the court intended by the quoted language to condemn
the comment rule by implication. Since the court was dealing
witl: a case in which the defendant had been held in contempt
for invoking the privilege, we believe it was referring to
more direct penalties or interferences with the unfettered
exer<:ise of the defendant's free will than the drawing of the
reasonable inferences that may fiow from silence and com~
mcnt thereon. In this respect it cannot be overemphasized
that whether or not the cOurt or prosecutor comments on the
defEndant's failure to testify, the jury will draw adverse
inferences therefrom. It will expect the defendant to present
all the evidence he can to escape conviction, and it will nat·
uraUy infer that his failure to explain or deny evidence against
him when the facts are peculiarly within his knowledge arises
from his inability to do so. "Such an inference is natural and
irresistible. It will be drawn by honest jurymen, and no
instruction will prevent it; "8 (Parker v. Btate,61 N.J.Law
308, 314 [39 A. 651], ati'd., 62N.J.Law 801 [45 A. 1092];
. see Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 60 [67 S.Ct. 1672,
91 L.Ed 1903, 171 A.L.R.1223] (concurring opinion); 8tate
v. Grebe, 17 Kan. 458, 459; Btate v.Cleaves, 59 Me. 298,
300-301 [8 Am.Rep. 422].) The Constitution is not at war
with common sense. (See Mapp v.Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,657
{81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 84 A.L.R.2d 933].) It does
not compel the court to· instruct the jurors to ignore inferences their reason dictates. The prevailing view is that such
an instruction would be futile and confusing.' (8 Wigmore
on Evidence (McNaughton Rev. 1961) p. 436.) [18] The
defendant, then,.is normally faced with the choice of testifying to avoid adverse inferences or of remaining silent and
suffering their cons('quences. The comments do not magnify
tiThe eomment merely applies here the established rule on failure t~
produee evidenee--' I That evidenee is to be estimated not only by its
own intrinsie weight, but also aeeording to the evidenee whieh it is in
the power 01'. one side to produee and of the other to contradict."
(Code Civ. Proe., § 2061, subd. 6.)
'One state requires lIuch an instruetion to be Jiven (Ind.Ann.Btat.,
§ 9·1603 (1956» and others requi,re that it be given if requested. (8tate
v. PalleZich, 150 Wash. 411, 420 [273 P. 182]; 8tate Y. Walker, 94 W.Va.
691,697·698 [120 S.E. 171].) Two states require the jury not to consider
the inferenee in making its deeision. (Kan.Gen.Stat., § 62·1420 (1949);
Oaf/alelt Y. 8tate, 152 Tex.Crim.Rep. 198 [211 S.W.2d 950]. Bee gen·
erally 8 Wigmore on Evidence (MeNaughton Rev.1t61) pp. 436·437.)
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these normal negative eonseqUE'nces to the extent that they
become a "penalty" prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. [14J Although the comments might encourage some
defendants to testify to avoid the inferences that may reasonably be drawn from their failure to do so (People v. Adamson,
27 Cal.2d 478, 487 [165 P.2d 3]), we are of the opinion that
this encouragement does not amount to the compUlsion to
testify condemned by the Fifth Amendment. The comments
merely guide the jury in doing what it would normally do
in any case. In some cases, comments might aid the defendant by preventing the jury from giving too much weight to
Ilis refusal to take the stand. (See Bruce, The Right to Comment on the Failur.e of the Defendant to Testify, 31 Mich.
L.Rev. 226, 231.)
Defendant contends that People v.Tyler, 36 Cal. 522, 530,
and People v. Adamson, 27 Cal.2d 478, 487 [165 P.2d 3J,
establish that the California comment rule violates the privilege against self-incrimination as defined in the Fifth Amendment. In the Tyler case,however, the court was concerned
only with the state privilege against self-incrimination, and
in the Adamson case it held, following Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U.S. 78 [29 S.Ct. 14, 53 L.Ed. 97], that the federal privilege was not binding on the states. Accordingly, any statements or implications in those opinions on the scope of the
federal privilege were necessarily dicta. Whatever the court
may have believed at the times it decided those cases, we are
now for the first time required to face the federal constitutional issue. [15J We are bound by the California Constitution '8 provision for comment unless it clearly violates the
United States Constitution. Since we do not believe that it
does so, we are precluded from giving effect to any contrary
implications in Tyler or Adamson.
[16J Defendant contends that the reason a defendant refuses to testify is that his prior convictions will be introduced
in evidence to impeach him (Code Civ. Proc., § 2051) and
not that he is unable to deny the accusations. It is true that
the defendant might fear that his prior convictions will prejudice ,the jury, and therefore another possible inference can
be drawn from his refusal to take the stand. The inference
that the jury is authqrized to draw from the failure to take
the stand, however, need not be the only plausible one to be
rational under the due process clause. (People v. Adamson,
27 Cal.2d 478, 493 [165 P.2d 3).) Moreover, without the
comment rule, the defendant still faces the dilemma of choos-
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ing to testify and having his prior convictions introduced
or of remaining silent and not giving this evidence to the
jury. The defendant must weigh the danger of impeachment
by the introduction of prior convictions for every witness
he calls for the defense. "The fact that the witness may also
be the defendant makes the choice more difficult but a denial
of due process does not emerge from the circumstances."
(Adamson v. Oalifornia, 332 U.S. 46, 57-58 [67 S.Ct. 1672,
91 L.Ed 1903, 171 A.L.R. 1223].)
[17] The privilege against self-incrimination protects the
defendant from· assisting the prosecution in building its case
against him. It cannot protect him from the inferences that
may reasonably be drawn from his failure to rebut the
prosecution's case to the best of his apparent ability. For the
court and counsel studiously to ignore those inferences or
for the court to instruct that no inference is to be drawn
from the defendant's failure to testify can only result in
confusing the jury. [18] The existence of the priVilege is
a matter of common knowledge, and whatever use the defendant makes of it at his trial is also a fact known to the
jury. The objective of the court's instructions and counsel's
arguments is to assist the jury in reaching the correct decision on the basis of all of the evidence before it. The Fifth
Amendment imposes no pointless taboo on the pursuit of that
objective.
[19] Defendant contends finally that the trial court erred
at the trial on the issue of penalty in admitting into evidence
inflammatory details' of other crimes committed by him. It
does not appear, however, that the trial court abused its
discretion in determining that the probative value of the
challenged evidence outweighed any probable prejudicial effect. (See People v. Terry, 61 Ca1.2d 137, 142-145 [37 Cal.
Rptr. 605,390 P.2d 381].)
The judgment is reversed.
Tobriner, J., Peek, J., and Dooling, J.,. concurred.
~

PETERS, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in the
judgment of reversal, and. in those portions of the majority
opinion which are unrelated to the issue raised by the California comment rule. In that connection tIle majority hold that
*Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assign·
by the Chairman of the Judicinl Council.

~ent
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section 13 of article I of the state Constitution as amended in
19341 is not rendered unconstitutional by the decision of MaZloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 [84 S.Ct. 1489,12 L.Ed.2d 653]. I cannot
agree with this conclusion, and dissent therefrom. In my opinion the prosecutor's arguments and the trial court's charge to
the jury, aU relating to tIle inferences to be indulged because
defendant did not take the stand, violated his constitutional
rights as now guaranteed him by the federal and state Constitutions.
In my opinion the majority in reaching their conclusion
not only misinterpret the United States Supreme Court eases,
and their impact on the California comment rule, but fail
to consider the real impact of several California cases on the
subject under discussion.
.
The majority concede that Malloy established the rule that
the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination binding on the states, and
quote the Malloy language to the effect that "The Fourteenth
Amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege
that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal infringement-the right of a person to remain silent unless he
chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will,
and to suffer no penalty ... for such silence" (378 U.S. 1, 8),
In the face of this concession, however, the majority then
hold that because of the narrow scope of the permission to
comment in California-i.e., becanse the penalty for not testifying is not very great--such "comment does not conflict with
the policies of the federal privilege against self-incrimination. "
I am unable to read into Malloy any inference that a slight
penalty is "no penalty" at all. I am unable to subscribe to
the theory that because the inferences to be drawn and commented upon are circumscribed, they do not affect "the
unfettered exercise" of defendant's will to remain silent.
As a matter of fact, there is explicit language to the contrary
in Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189 [63 8.Ct. 549, 87
L.Ed 704] (cited in the majority opinion). There the high
court said (at pp. 196-197) that "wllere the claim of privilege
IThe section contains a guarantee that the accused in a criminal case
shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself. This is couched
in the exact language of the Fiftll Amendment to the United States
Constitution, and obviously has the same meaning and effect. The 1934
amendment added that "in any criminal case, whether the defendant
testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny by his testimony any
evidence or facts in the case against him may be commented upon by the
court and by couusel, and may be cousidered by the court or the jury,"
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is asserted and unqualifiedly granted, the requirements of
fair trial may preclude any comment. That certainly is true
where the claim of privilege could not properly be denied.
The rule which obtains when the accused fails to take the
stand (Wilson v. United Btates, 149 U.S. 60 [13 8. Ct. 765,
37 L.Ed. 650]) is then applicable.... 'The claim of privilege
and its allowance is properly no part of the evidence submitted to the jury, and no inferences whatever can be legitimately drawn by them from the legal assertion by the witness
of his constitutional right. The allowance of the privilege
would be a mockery of justice, if either party is to be affected
injuriously by it.' " (Italics added.)
The majority attempt to distinguish Johnson on the ground
that there the defendant had been misled as to the consequences of his reliance on the privilege. That, of course, does
not explain the explicit holding above quoted. We as a state
court, on federal constitutional questions, are bound by the
unqualified language of the United States Supreme Court
to the effect that where, as here, the privilege against testifying could not have been denied, fair trial precludes "any
comment" thereon or the invitation to draw "any" inference therefrom.
The majority conclude with the assertion that the comment
allowed by the California rule does not place before the jury
anything not already within its general store of knowledge-that is that the jurors as knowledgeable persons are aware
that one capable of testifying in rebuttal of incriminating
evidence will ordinarily do so. Therefore, it is asserted,
neither harm nor injury can occur by reminding them of
that fact. 2 That is to assert that the 1934 amendment accomplished nothing at all. But it accomplished a great deal,
because, as will be later pointed out, it was necessary to pass
it to change the then existing California law which prohibited
any comment at all.
The majority opinion argues at some length that Malloy
did not, by implication or otherwise, overrule Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46 [67 8. Ct. 1672, 91 L.Ed. 1903, 171
A.L.R. 12~3], which affirmed this court's holding in People
v. Adamson, 27 Ca1.2d 478 [165 P.2d 3], on the theory that
2This reasoning might suppoJlt a holding that the error was not prejudicial, or a charge or comment to the effect that the jury may draw the
usual inferences from the failure of the ilefense, as distinct from the defendant personally, to offer evidence in rebuttal of incriminating testimony. Such instruction or comment would serve all the purposes advo('.atcd in the majority opinion without raising the constitutional issue.

!
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under then existing law tile Fifth Amendment, not then being
binding on the states, did not prohibit the comment permitted
by the 1934 amendment.
.
The majority opinion concedes that MaUoy overruled Adamson insofar as it held that the Fifth Amendment was not
binding on the states. It is now the law, since Malloy, that
the states are bound, via the Fourteenth Amendment, by the
provisions of the Fifth Amendment. When Adamson was decided by tIle Supreme Court this was not the law. Thus
Adamson could not, and did not, discuss the question with
which we are concerned. Adamson did not hold the California comment rule was consistent with the provisions of the
Fifth Amendment, but held simply that the validity of the
rule was not to be tested by the provisions of that amendment.
Thus, it is obvious that the portions of Adamson not overruled
by Malloy are not and cannot be determinative of the issue
before us now. What is now left of Adamson is merely the
holding that this court did not err in holding that the California comment rule did not violate the California Constitution. But that is not the problem here involved. The question
now before us, not decided in Adamson, is whether our state
constitutional provision may stand in view of the federal mandate. To determine that question we need only refer to the
unchallenged rule in California prior to the adoption of the
1934 amendment.
As already pointed out, long before 1934 the California
Constitution provided, and now provides, in the identical
language of the Fifth Amendment, that no defendant in a
criminal case shall be compelled to be a witness against himself (see fn. 1). Before the 1934 amendment to that section,
in a long line of cases, this court interpreted the state-conferred constitutional immunity (which is identical to the
Fifth Amendment) to prohibit any comment whatever on the
dt>fendant's failure to take the stand. This long line of cases
is in fact being overruled by the majority opinion.
The first case to interpret the original constitutional provision similar to the Fifth Amendment was People v. Tyler,
36 Cal. 622, 530. Prior to Tyler, a defendant in a criminal
action was incompetent as a witness. California then adopted
a statute (now Pen. Code, § 1323.5) making a defendant
compl'tent at his own request. In Tyler, the prosecution successful1y claimed in the trial court that failure to take the
stand and deny testimony presumably within his knowledge
gave rise to inferences adverse to the defendant. This court
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revel'8ed and held that the policy of t11e recently adopted
statute making defendant, at his request, competent was:.
simply to allow the defendant to rebut evidence against him .1
if he so desired, but not to compel him to take the stand, or to
suffer adverse inferences. It was further held that any suchl
policy would be violative of the privilege against self-incrimi.
nation contained in the California Constitution if his failure
to testify were used to support" an inference unfavorable to
him" (36 Cal. at p. 528).
Thereafter, Tyler was followed without exception until,
65 years later, in 1934, the California Constitution was
amended to authorize comment on defendant's failure to
testify. These cases establish without question that under
the old law (now binding on California via the Fifth Amendment) defendant's failure to testify could not be used in
any manner to prejudice him.8
People v. Albertson, supra, 23 Cal.2d 550, referred to in
the footnote, is of particular interest because there Chief
Justice Traynor (then Justice Traynor) in his concurring
opinion said (at p. 584): "Before the constitutional amendment it was error to comment on the defendant's failure
to take the stand or to advise the jury that it could draw
inferences unfavorable to him on that account. (People v.
Tyler, 36 Cal. 522.) The constitutional amendment changes
the rule of the Tyler case and permits such comment but does
not do more." He then went on to hold that the comment of
the prosecutor in Albertson went beyond that allowable under
the constitutional amendment.
Under these cases, it is perfectly clear that prior to the
1934 amendment the then existing constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination prohibited any comment about de8A partial list of these eases follows: People v. McGungul, 41 Cal.
429, 431; People v. Brown, 53 Cal. 66, 67; People v. Baniler8, 114 Cal.
216 [46 P. 153] (citing McGungill, rather than Tyler); People v. Kromphold, 172 Cal. 512, 523 [157 P. 599] (affirming the rule, but holding the
error to have been cured, and hence not prejudicial); People v. Mayefl.,
188 Cal. 237,259 [205 P. 435, 24 A.L.R. 1383] (also affirming judgment
because of lack of prejudice); Fros8 v. Wotton, 3 Cal.2d 384, 393 (44
P.2d 350] (civil case applying the Tyler rule to a comparable situation,
and including a history of the privilege indicating the necessity of disallowing comment); People v. Albertson, 23 Ca1.2d 550, 584 [145 P.2d 7]
(concurring .pinion by Traynor, J., adding the comment as an additional
ground for reversal) ; People v. MorriB, 3 Cal.App. 1, 6 [84 P. 463] (holding comment to be prejudicial per se, even when instruction to disregard
it was given after objection); l'eople v. Ke'ko, 27 Cal.App. 351, 353
[149 P. 1003] (citing Morris only); People v. Wademan, 38 Cal.App_
116,133 [175 P. 791] (acknowledging rule, but distinguishing the case on
th~ faets); and People v. Brown, 81 Cal.App. 226, 242 [253 P. 735].
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fendant's failure to take the stand. No inference of any kind
unfavorable to him could be predicated on such failure. Now,
since MaUoy, the state is bound by the provisions of the Fifth
Amendment which is framed in language identical to that used
in the California Constitution prior to its amendment. A
fortiori, therefore, the present ruJe in California is now the
same as the rule that existed in California before 1934. It
is that rule that the majority opinion so cavalierly disregards
and necessarily overrules.·
Some reference should be made to this court's decision in
People v. Adamson, supra, 27 Cal.2d 478, written by Justice
Traynor, which upheld the constitutionality of the 1934
amendment under the California Constitution. In that case
this court did not then hold, as it attempts to do today, that
there was no conflict between the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to comment on the exercise of that
privilege. Quite to the contrary it carefully and correctly
held that such a conflict existed but that the state, by the
1934 amendment, had qualified that right. At page 487 this
court then stated : "The practical effect of the 1934 amendment may be that many defendants who otherwise would not
take the stand will feel compelled to do so to avoid the adverse effects of the comments and consideration authorized
by the amendment. . . . Such a coercive effect, however, is
sanctioned by the amendment, which, being later in time,
controls provisions adopted earlier." It will be noted that
there this court characterized the comment rule as constituting
a "compelling" waiver of the privilege and as having a
"coercive effect" upon a defendant who desired to avail himself of the privilege. Today the court characterizes the comment rule as imposing but an inconsequential penalty.
From the foregoing it follows that, unless the majority are
willing to overrule People v. Tyler, supra, 36 Cal. 522, and
the many cases following it, and People v. Adamson, supra,
27 Ca1.2d 478, there is no alternative but to hold that the
California comment rule creates. a compulsion upon a defendant "who otherwise would not take the stand" and has a
"coercive effect." The contrary rule adopted bythe majority
does not permit a defendant "to remain silent unless he
4It should also be mentioned thnt New Jersey (a state which bad
n eomment rule compnrable to t~at permitted by the 1934 amerdment
to our Constitution) bas held that in light of Mallo" the old New Jersey
rllll' \'job!!'s the privileges grantN} uy the Fiftll Amendment (Stale v.
Murphy (1964) 85 N.J. Super. 391 [204 A.2d 888]).
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chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will."
Malloy informs us that such a defendant is "to suffer no
penalty . . . for such silence." The majority rule authorizes
the court and prosecutor to invite the jury to indulge in those
inferences which Johnson holds would constitute a "mockery
of justice." Thus, in my opinion, the comment rule is unconstitutional. That being so it was error to permit such comment.
Were it not for the other errors pointed out in the majority
opinion which require a reversal, the error under discussion,
however, might not necessarily require a reversal. In my
opinion the beneficent provisions of section 4% of article VI
of our state Constitution are applicable to such error.
It is urged that that section is not applicable to errors
involving due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. In
this connection reliance is had upon some very strong language to that effect in such cases as People v. Kiihoa, 53 Cal.
2d 748, 752 [3 Cal.Rptr. 1, 349 P.2d 673] ; People v. Modesto,
59 Cal.2d 722 [31 Cal.Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33] ; People v. Muza,
178 Cal.App.2d 901 [3 Cal.Rptr. 395] ; and in Witkin, California Criminal Procedure (1963) 733-734. Comfort is also
found in the language of sueh federal decisions as Rogers v.
Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 [81 S.Ct. 735, 5 L.Ed.2d 760] ; Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 [84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908],
and similar cases dealing with the admission of involuntary
confessions. The language of these and other authorities,
when separated from the problem there under discussion,
appears to support the proposition that whenever the error
is predicated upon constitutional grounds and results in the
denial of a fair trial (due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment) it is reversible per se, and the resulting judgment is not saved by the fact that the error was not prejudicial. However, when such authorities are viewed together
with those which have failed to reverse in the presence of
acknowledged constitutional error, it becomes apparent that
those requiring reversal per Be comprise a specific class, dealing with the admission of coerced confessions or evidence
obtained by brutality or other conduct shocking to the sensibilities. Other authorities (both federal and state) indicate
that in many other situations the courts have held error
which cOl'lstituted a denial of due process to have been nonprejudicial and hence nonreversible.
Looking first to the federal rule, the authorities relied upon
dealt either with the use of a coerced confession or evidence
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obtained by similar coercion, force or brutality. They are
the eases that adopted the so-called "exclusionary rule."
That rule requires the absolute exclusion of evidence obtained
in the manner indicated, as well as all evidence which is the
product thereof ("fruit of the poisoned tree"), and likewise
requires reversal if such confession or evidence has not been
excluded. On the other hand, Malloy (which is the cause of
our present reexamination of the rule) gives no hint that the
highest federal court considers every violation of due process
to be prejudicial per se. Many prior decisions of the United
States Supreme Court indicate that it will not reverse for
every acknowledged constitutional error, some of which dealt
with error of the type alleged herein. In Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 [54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674, 90 A.L.R.
575], it was held that the absence of defendant during the
proceedings against him would constitute a denial of due
process. However, the court refused to reverse because the
defendant was absent from such a minor portion of the proceeding that no prejudice resulted. Justice Cardozo, speaking
for the court, said (at pp. 106-108): "Nowhere in the decisions of this court is there a dictum, and still less a ruling,
that the Fourteenth Amendment assures the privilege of
presence when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a
shadow. . . . So far as the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, the presence of a defendant is a condition of due
process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be
thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only." It appears that in Snyder the high court applied to acknowledged
constitutional error the same test required by our state constitutional provision prohibiting reversal in the absence of a
miscarriage of justice.
In J ohmon v. United States, supra, 318 U.S. 189, the court
held that comment on the defendant's reliance on his privilege against self-incrimination was error, but failed to reverse
because the error had been waived. That was not tantamount
to affirmance because the error.was nonprejudicial, but indicates that denial of due process is not always reversible
per se.
In Wilson \". United States, 149 U.S. 60 [13 S.Ct. 765, 37
L.Ed. 650], the court reversed because of the prosecutor's
comment on defendant's failure to take the stand as a witness.
There the court held the comment to be error because of a
federal statute requiring that no presumption shall be created
against defendant by reason of his decision not to testify, and
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therefore was not required to rely on the constitutional prO::·,
visions. However, the following language (at p. 70) is per:-'.:i
.'·'
suasive herein: "'We do not see how this statute can
completely enforced, unless it be adopted as a rule of practice . -4
that such improper and forbidden reference by counsel for'~~
the prosecution shall be regarded good ground for a new trial.:
in aU cases where the proofs of guilt are not so clear and;~
conclusive that the court can say affirmatively the accused "i
couzil not have been harmed from that cause.''' (Italics t
added.) While the closing clauses of the foregoing quota-!
tion may be less liberal than our Watson rule (People v.
Watson, 46 Ca1.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243]), it conclusively
demonstrates that, in the field of illegal comment, the United
States Supreme Court has in the past been mindful of the fact
that error may be nonreversible when the circumstances show
it to be nonprejudicial. For similar reasoning by the lower
federal courts, see Coleman v. Denno (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1963)
223 F.Supp. 938, affirmed in United States v. Denno (2d
Cir. 1964) 330 F.2d 441; United States v. Di Carlo (2d Cir.
1933) 64 F.2d 15.
Turning now to the California authorities, even more cause
exists to adhere to the dictates of section 4% of article VI of
our state Constitution. Prior to the 1934 amendment author- .
izing comment on a defendant's failure to testify as a wit- .
ness, as already pointed out, such comment was violative of
the defendant's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. But, during that period, it was the uniform rule that
such comment, although erroneous, did not require reversal
if, under the circumstances of the case, it was not prejudicial
(People v. Mayen, supra, 188 Cal. 237, 259.)S A similar,
although not identical issue was presented in People v.
O'Bryan, 165 Cal. 55 [130 P. 1042], wherein the court held
that defendant's previous testimony before the grand jury
had not been voluntary, and for that reason it was error to
allow evidence of that previous testimony to be produced at
trial. However, conviction was affirmed on the ground that
the error was not prejudicial.
Subsequent to the 1934 amendment authorizing comment
on the defendant's failure to t.estify there was no cause for
the courts ttl pass upon the prejudicial or nonprejudicial

bef

SCertain language contained in the Mayen opinion, going to an entirel;r
different point, has reeentl;r been 'disapproved in People v. Mattutm,
61 Cal.2d 466, 470 [39 Ca1.Rptr. 1, 393 P.2d 161). Such disapproval does
. not affect the matters here involved.
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nature of a procedure which was no longer erroneous. However, the introduction of, or comment upon, defendant's previous testimony before the grand jury was presented on several
occasions. In Peop1,e v. Kynette, 15 Ca1.2d 731, 749-751 [104
P.2d 794], it had been held that a defendant who had voluntarily testified before the grand jury as to some matters,
but who had refused to answer other questions on the ground
of self-incrimination, and who voluntarily testified at his
trial, migllt be impeached by cross-examination as to the inconsistency between his exculpatory testimony at trial and
his alleged basis for claiming privilege before the grand jury.6
The opinion pointed out the limited purpose for which such
evidence might be introduced. Shortly thereafter, a similar
problem was presented in People v. Montgomery, 47 Cal.
App.2d 1 [117 P.2d 437]. There the court was bound by
Kynette to hold the introduction of the matters which transpired before the grand jury to have been admissible for the
limited purpose of impeachment. However, the court found
error in the fact that the prosecutor was allowed to comment
on the evidence for the purpose of drawing the inferences
beyond that specific limitation. That error, however, was held
to have been nonprejudicial, the court stating (at p. 21) that
"it does not follow that every' invasion of even a constitutional right necessarily requires a reversal, . . . " (Citing
Peop1,e v. O'Bryan, supra, 165 Cal. 55, 60.)
Erroneous denials of constitutional guarantees other than
those arising out of the Fifth Amendment (but many which
were held to have constituted a denial of due process) have
consistently been held not to require reversal when not prejudicial. A few examples are set forth:
(a) Error arising out of the absence of defendant from a
portion of the proceedings-People v. Isby, 30 Ca1.2d 879,
894 [186 P.2d 405]; Peop1,e v. Daniels, 85 Ca1.App.2d 182,
195 [192 P.2d 788] ; People v. Miller, 33 Cal. 99; Peop1,e v.
Erwin,4 Cal.App. 394,396 [88 P. 371]. (The last two were
decided prior to the adoption of section 4% of article VI.)
(b) Failure to instruct defendant as to certain of his rights
-People v. 'O'Brien, 88 Cal. 483, 489-490 [26 P. 362].
(c) Illegal search and seizure-People v. Parham, 60 Cal.
2d 378 [33 Ca1.Rptr. 497, 384 P.2d 1001], wherein it is said
(at p. 386) : "To require automatic reversal for such harmless error could not help but generate pres.'3ure to find that
6This holding of Kynette may now be open to question in view of

Malloy.
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the unreasonable police conduct was lawful after all and
thereby to undermine constitutional standards of police conduct to avoid needless retrial. . . . An exclusionary rule so
rigidly administered could thereby defeat itself."
If the word "prosecution" is substituted for the word
"police" where the latter twice appears in the quotation
from Parham, the reasoning applies equally to improper comment on defendant's failure to take the stand.
In this opinion there is no necessity to determine whether
the claimed error was prejudicial, first because the majority
has ruled that it was not error, and second because the judgment must be reversed for reasons other than the violation of
the comment rule.
I agree with everything said in the majority opinion, including the reversal, except that portion discussing the comment rule. From that portion of the opinion, I dissent.
SCHAUER, J.,. Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in
those portions of the majority opinion which resolve the issue
grounded on the California comment rule (Cal. Const., art I,
§ 13). Specifically, I agree with the discussion and conclusions
of the Chief Justice relative to the applicability and effect of
Malloy v. Hogan (1964) 378 U.S. 1 [84 S.Ct. 1489,12 L.Ed.2d
653], and upholding the good sense and constitutional vitality
of the subject rule.
To suggest that reasonable inferences will not or should
not be drawn by the fact finder from the failure of an accused
to testify as to matters obviously within his knowledge is
absurd. Common sense tells us that in such a situation the
inferences will be adverse to the defendant if no commenti.e., no instruction-is given relative to the right of an accused
to stand on his plea of not guilty and the comprehensive
burden of the state to prove every element of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. The California comment rule operates
constructively to make real and workable to a conscientious
fact finder the right of the accused and the burden of the
prosecution.
The'use of the comment rule in defendant's trial was not
only constitutionally permissible, it was good sense and
eminently fair. When there is neither relevant court instruction nor any reference by court or counsel to defendant's
silence in the face of obvious and significant evidence of guilt,
·Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.
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the impact of the silence on the jury will more likely intensify
than diminish the force of the positive evidence. ConS'cientious and intelligent jurors are curious jurors; they yearn for
full instructions covering their duty in resolving every issue
before them.
The subject California rule is not so much a comment rule
as it is an instruction as to law and a caution as to duty: it
emphasizes the burden of the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt every essential element of the crime charged;
it makes altogether clear. the right of the defendant not to
testify at an and not to be prejudiced by his o'wn mere silence;
it precludes the jury from drawing any inference adverse to
the defendant because of his decision not to testify unless it is
further shown that defendant has knowledge of, and the
ability to produce, facts which could deny or explain, or in
some way obviate the effect of, evidence which if believed,
would establish guilt. The rule is essentially correlative both
to defendant's fundamental right of silence and to the state's
burden of proof; it becomes operative only when competent
evidence has been adduced which is sufficient to establish
(1) a prima facie case against the accused, and (2) his ability
to furnish exculpatory evidence. Then the necessity for, and
the fairness of, the rule become obvious. The comment itself
must be hypothetically definitive and explanatory of the rule
and its application. Certainly as held by the majority such
.. carefully circumscribed comment does not con1lict with the
policies of the federal privilege against self-incrimination."
Failure to comment at all on the obvious facts, or on the
other extreme, categorically directing the jurors not to draw
inferences which the undisputed evidence and a sound mind
dictate, would be futile and would tend to make a mockery
of the fact finding process.
Weare bound to recognize that the essential function of
jurors is to draw (or resolve conflicting) inferences from all
material circumstances. The failure of a defendant to testify
relative to tentatively established incriminating facts which
are peculiarly within his knO\vledge is in itself a fact whic)],
as hereinabove suggested, may become the more portentous if
comment thereon, as required and limited by the California
rule, is precluded. As the Chief Justice says, "The defendant
. . . is normally faced 'With the choice of testifying to avoid
adverse inferences or of remaining silent and suffering their
consequences. " The purpose of a fair trial is to discover
t.he truth and upon the truth to render the judgment provided
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by law. A fair trial cannot be had in an intellectual vacuum;
and a fair trial-of course, but it bears emphasis-must be
equally concerned with fairness to the whole body politic as
well as to the defendant.
I do not concur in the conclusional declaration that "With
respect to defendant's last and most complete and damaging
statements, all of the conditions of the Escobedo holding were
met.... Accordingly, the judgment must be reversed." I am
not persuaded that the hypothesis is tenable or that this result
must follow. What may be "most ... damaging statements"
is typically for jury and trial judge appraisal. And as I read ,
the Escobedo opinion I am impressed with the conclusion that
Mr. Justice Goldberg diligently sought to confine its application to the case he defined and decided. I would limit its
reach by the aggregate-not by a selected item or items-of
the congeries of facts which he so painstakingiy assembled
and by multiple reiterations emphasizes. As demonstrated
to my satisfaction by Justice Burke in his dissenting opinion
in People v. Dorado (1965) ante, pp. 338, 364 [41 Cal.
Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361], the recited facts of that case
clearly show that the majority ruling therein was not compelled by Escobedo. To the contrary, as hereinafter documented, Dorado appears to me to extend the scope of Escobedo
in an area forbidden to us by the California Constitution.
I agree with Chief Justice Traynor that Massiah v. United.
States (1964) 377 U.S. 201 [84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246],
is not controlling here, but I note also a related statement
which on its face might appear to be a speculative or advisory ruling relative to a question of law and fact which
mayor may not arise on the third trial of the case at bench.
The proposition is stated by the majority as follows: "The
statements made between the time Connie's body was found
and the time defendant sought to consult again with his
attorney present still a different problem. Under our holding
in People v. Dorado, ante, p. 338 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169,
398 P.2d 361], these statements are inadmissible unless 8S
to them defendant waived his right to counsel and his right
to remain silent. In view of his reference to his attorney's
advice with respect to making these statements, it is possible
that defendant waived his rights as to them. That reference
was ambiguous at best, however, and unless the prosecution
can preseflt additional evidence of waiver on retrial, these
statements should be excluded." The metage of inferences
which may be drawn from the myriad cumulant circumstallces of a trial is both primarily and distinctively a trial
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judge's function. It is only upon the complete absence of
tenable inferences supportive of the trial court's mling that
we should disturb a judgment in this respect. I do not find
myself sufficiently qualified by the record of the second trial
now before us to rule for the next trial that "unless the
prosecution can prcsent additional evidence of waiver . . .
the statements should be excluded." In the ease at bench I
find no error in their admission.
I agree with Chief Justice Traynor that on any tenable
view of the law .. The statements made by defendant before
Connie's body was discovered are admissible" and that
"there is no basis for their exclusion." These statements
alone (i.e., excluding from consideration all other statements
by defendant), when considered with the other probative
evidence which was properly received, in my view amply support the judgment of the trial court. I also agree that "In
the present case the officers' investigatory and rescue operations were necessarily inextricably interwoven until Connie's
body was found, and it would be needlessly restrictive to
exclude any evidence lawfully obtained during the rescue
operations. Under these circumstances we do not believe that
the Massiah case is controlling."
Although, as above shown, I am in full accord with much
of the discussion by the Chief Justice, and with a number
of his important conclusions, I cannot agree that the judgment must or should be again reversed. It becomes necessary
to again refer to what I understand to be the duty unequivocally imposed upon this court by the Constitution of California which grants-and specificaUy limits-our jurisdiction
in the review of "criminal cases where judgment of death
has been rendered." I have reference to sections 41 and 4%, 2
article VI. I know of no power possessed by this court other
than such as is granted to it by the people of the state in the
Constitution of California. (Manifestly the grant of state
power does not come from the United States Constitution or
1California Constitution, article VI, aeetion 4: "The Supreme Court
shall have appellate jurisdiction . • . on questions of Jaw GZone, in all
criminal cases where judgment of death has been rendered; ••• " (Italics
added.) ,
2California Constitution, article VI, section 4*: "No judgment shall
be set asidt', or new trial grant.ed, in any ease, on the ground of mis·
direction of the jury, or of .the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of pleading, or for an,. error
as to any matter of prot'edure, unless, after an examination of the entire
cause, including the evidenee, the court shall be of the opinion that the
error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. I I
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the judgment of a federal court.) That same grantor, in the
same document, also expressly delimits our power in tbe
specific area which is relevant. That limitation, it appears to
me, is transgressed by the recent majority decision in People
v. Dorado (1965) supra, ante, p. 338, as is indicated by the
dissents of both Mr. Justice McComb and Mr. Justice Burke.
I have no quarrel with the forthright narration of facts
in the majority opinion of tbe case at bench. Among other
things the majority candidly state "It is not disputed that
defendant killed the two girls." I add that on any reasonable view of the evidence it is not disputable that tbe evidence sustains the jury's implied findings at both the first
trial and at the second trial that the object of the two
murders was to accomplish the rape of Connie. I cannot find
anything in this record which justifies the conclusion of fact
or of law that either the conviction· of defendant or the
sentence of death pronounced thereon constitutes a miscarriage of justice.
Indubitably it is our duty to be concerned with the philosophy as well as the letter of criminal law. Of course
our system is not a perfect one. It is not yet given to human
beings to create a society perfectly motivated or governed.
Men of goodwill may differ sharply in selecting the means
to an end, if not as to the objective itself. The ever increasing
number in recent years of reversals on technical grounds of
judgments in major criminal cases suggests the need for
reexamination of the incidents of our philosophy and of our
procedures. Are we to abandon or continue to recognize the
theory that as between mankind and the lower animals there
is a major difference in social responsibility T Are we to
continue or abandon the theory that human beings are free
moral agents' That those who fail to be restrained by moral
concepts may nevertheless be deterred away from, or influenced toward, a given course of conduct by punishment on
the one hand or reward on the other T In our organized society
today, should the courts, as perhaps the chief instrumentality
for attaining its elementary objectives, be primarily concerned with protecting the crime perpetrating nonconformist,
not merely in the heretofore recognized constitutional rights
of law abiding members, but, as against execution of penal
sanctions ior demonstrated guilt, in revising procedural rules
and applying the revisions retroactively for tIle benefit of
the accused' Or should we, give our first concern to protecting law abiding members of that society by firm and prompt
enforcement of tenable rules of law as against the rapist-
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murderers and similar types of criminal nonconformists T
Certainly even the most evil one shall have his due process
and fair trial. This defendant has enjoyed these benefits
twice over. The sledge hammer slayings of Connie Mack and
Mary Mack cannot be undone. But sure, prompt and unrelenting exaction of the penalty of the law could serve to
save other innocents from similar deaths. If this philosophy
is wrong then it would seem that our entire penal-sanctionfor-crime system of law should be abandoned. But until a
better system has been provided let us not destroy or further
deplete the efficacy of the one we have.
For the reasons sufficiently articulated in my dissent in
People v. Modesto (1963) 59 Cal.2d 722, 735 [31 Cal.Rptr.
225, 382 P.2d 33], I could not then concur in reversing the
judgment on the prior appeal. The reversing justices made
no finding that it was more probable than not that a verdict
more favorable to the defendant would have resulted in the
absence of the then declared error. The reversal therefore,
as I understand the language of, and respect due, our Constitution, was, and today's is, in excess of this court's appellate jurisdiction as exclusively granted and specifically limited
by sections 4 and 4%, article VI, California Constitution
(see fns. 1 and 2, ante, p. 467).
I think it is fair also to add that the reversals of the judgments, both on this appeal and the preceding one, appear to
be due not to any incompetence or neglect or mistakes of the
investigating or prosecuting officers, or of the trial judges.
The reversals have come because courts of appellate jurisdiction have seen fit, or felt compelled, to change the rules
goverr..ing relevant procedures and to make the changes retroactively effective. If the compulsion for retroactive application is not absolute it should not be indulged. The people of
California, as well as this defendant, have a right to due
process and fair law enforcement. Among the people who
are punished most severely by the new trials are, of course,
the family members of the murdered little girls.
It appears to me that the proceedings on, and the result., of,
the second trial, as illumined also by the record of the first
trial, demonstrate that there has been no miscarriage of
justice in the ttial court.
For all the reasons llereinabove stated I would affirm the
jUdgment.
McComb, J., concurred.
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